You have known you needed to make this hire for nine years. Or seven. Or twelve. The exact number is not the point. The point is that you have known for so long that the knowing has become part of the operating texture of the business, woven into the days you put in, the trips you do not take, the family events you leave early. The hire you have not made is what you have, instead of the life you would have if you had made it.
We are talking about the second-in-command. Some people call it a COO. Some call it a president. Some call it a general manager. The label is downstream of the function. The function is the person who, when you take a two-week vacation, runs the place, and the place runs.
Almost no founder in the lower middle market has this person. Almost every founder needs them. The gap between needing them and having them, multiplied across the founder population, is responsible for more of the Misalignment Tax than any other single operational fact.
What this hire actually is
The second-in-command is not a senior executive who reports to you. You probably have several of those. The second-in-command is the person who, on any given Tuesday, decides what the senior executives are working on. They sit between you and the operating leaders. They make sure the strategy you have set is being executed. They handle the things you should not be handling. They keep the operating tempo of the business.
A useful diagnostic: if your senior team has a recurring meeting that you run, you do not have a second-in-command. If your senior team has a recurring meeting that someone else runs, and that meeting still happens when you are on vacation, and decisions are made in that meeting that get implemented before you return, you have a second-in-command. Most founders find this diagnostic uncomfortable, because most founders, on honest reflection, are still running every meeting that matters.
Cordis Institute’s work on operational succession in 200+ engagements found that the absence of a true second-in-command was the single strongest predictor of the key-person discount being applied in transaction. The discount, against an otherwise comparable business, runs in the 20% to 35% range. On a $12M EBITDA business at an 8x multiple, that is $20M to $33M of enterprise value left on the table.
Why founders defer it
We have asked dozens of founders this question. The answers cluster into three patterns.
The first is that the founder believes the right person does not exist. They have interviewed candidates. They have been disappointed. The pattern of disappointment is usually the same: the candidate does not have the founder’s instinct, the candidate does not understand the customer the way the founder does, the candidate makes decisions the founder would not have made.
This is a misreading of the role. The right second-in-command is not the founder. The right second-in-command is the operator. The founder’s job, once the hire is made, is to set the strategic direction. The operator’s job is to run the place. The candidates the founder rejected for “not making the decisions I would have made” are exactly the candidates the founder needs, because the alternative, hiring a junior version of the founder, defeats the entire purpose of the hire.
The second is that the founder believes they cannot afford the hire. The compensation for a real second-in-command in a $10M to $50M business is typically $200K to $400K base plus 20% to 50% bonus plus an equity participation. The total compensation, $300K to $800K all in, is a real number against most founders’ personal P&L of the business.
This is a misreading of the math. The hire pays for itself in three ways. First, the founder gets back 30% to 50% of their time, which can be redeployed to the work that actually grows the business, strategic accounts, partnership development, capital allocation. Second, the operational leverage of having someone run the place compounds over the years before transaction. A well-run business producing $12M in EBITDA today typically produces $15M to $18M in EBITDA two years from now under a competent operator, because the founder has had the bandwidth to do the strategic work. Third, at transaction, the existence of the second-in-command moves the multiple buyers will pay by one to two turns. The arithmetic, fully loaded, is not close.
The third reason is the real reason. The founder does not want to give up the role. The day-to-day operation of the business is what the founder built. The relationships with the senior team. The phone calls from operators. The being-in-the-middle-of-it. The founder will say they want to step back, but the act of actually stepping back is psychologically harder than founders predict.
This is not a moral failing. It is the structural cost of building a business over fifteen or twenty years. The business is a relationship. The hire is, in a small way, the end of that relationship as it has existed. The founder is being asked to grieve something they have not lost yet.
The three structural reasons it never gets done
Beyond the personal reasons, there are three structural reasons the hire does not get made.
First, the founder is the only person in the business who can decide to make the hire. The senior team will not lobby for it, because doing so would imply that they cannot run the place themselves, which is what they have been arguing all along. The board, if there is one, will not push hard enough, because they meet quarterly and the founder is the only one who lives with the consequences. The advisors who would push for it, M&A counsel, accountants, do not enter the picture until the transition window opens, which is too late.
Second, the hire is hard. The candidate pool for a real second-in-command at a $10M to $50M business is small. The right person needs to be senior enough to have operated, not so senior that they are running their own thing. They need to be comfortable in second chair, which is a temperament most senior operators do not have. They need to fit the culture, which usually means they have to be hireable in the founder’s geography. The search is typically six to nine months, and most founders do not realize how long it will take when they start.
Third, the onboarding is slow. The hire shows up on day one and cannot run the place yet. They need three to six months to learn the business, six to nine months to take real operational ownership, twelve months to have full operational authority. During that period, the founder has to consciously hand over decisions, which is the hardest part of the whole thing. The founder who makes the hire but cannot resist intervening for the first nine months is the founder who, eighteen months in, fires the hire for “not stepping up” and concludes that the role cannot be filled by anyone.
Add up the three: the founder is the only one who can initiate, the search is six to nine months, the onboarding is another twelve, and the founder has to discipline themselves throughout. Total elapsed time from “I should make this hire” to “I have made this hire and it is working,” roughly two years.
The practical sequence
Here is what the sequence looks like, by month, for a founder starting today.
Months 1 through 3. Decide. Write down what the role is. Write down what the second-in-command will own, what you will retain, and what the decision rights are at each level. This document is the spec for the hire. It is also a forcing function on you. Most founders who write this document discover that they have been describing the role to themselves loosely for years, and that the looseness is exactly what has prevented the hire.
Months 2 through 5. Search. Engage a search firm if the budget allows; the right firms for this work charge 25% to 33% of first-year compensation, which is real money but cheap relative to the cost of getting the hire wrong. If the budget does not allow, work your network systematically. Talk to 30 candidates. Interview the best 10. Reference-check the top three exhaustively. Hire the right one.
Months 5 through 8. Onboard. Block your own calendar to make this person a real participant in the senior team conversations from week one. Introduce them to your top five customers and top five vendors in the first 60 days. Hand them three operational decisions per week that you would normally make, and resist re-litigating them.
Months 8 through 14. Transfer authority. By month 8, the second-in-command should be running the recurring senior team meeting. By month 10, they should be making operational hiring decisions. By month 12, they should be running the place when you are not there. By month 14, the founder should be able to be unavailable for two weeks at a time without it being a problem.
Months 14 through 24. Build the partnership. The relationship between founder and second-in-command, once stable, is the operational engine of the next phase of the business. The founder sets direction. The operator runs the place. The compounding effect on enterprise value, on the founder’s quality of life, on the buyer-readiness of the business, all accelerates from here.
"The founder is being asked to grieve something they have not lost yet."
What buyers discount for the absence of this hire
Run the arithmetic on your own business. Take your current EBITDA. Apply the typical multiple for your sector and size, you can find empirical comps in Pratt’s Stats or the Capstone middle-market index. Apply the 25% discount buyers typically take for key-person dependency, the midpoint of the documented range. That is the gap between what you may currently expect and what buyers in this market are likely to pay, attributable to this one input.
For most readers of this piece, the figure buyers will discount for the absence of this hire is between $5M and $40M of what the founder would otherwise walk away with.
The hire costs you $1M to $2M over the period of the work, in compensation and search fees. The discount that closes, in what you walk away with on the day of transaction, is typically 5x to 30x that. There is no other single decision available to a lower-middle-market founder with this kind of leverage on retrade.
Why now
The work takes two years. The transition window most founders are working toward is three to five years out. If you start now, you have time. If you start in two years, you do not.
This is the most expensive form of procrastination available to a founder. It is also the most common.
The diagnostic the buyer will run on you, in the first ten minutes of the meeting we wrote about elsewhere in this issue, is exactly the diagnostic you should run on yourself now. Could someone other than you run this business, today, if you stepped out? If the answer is no, the work starts with this hire. It does not start with anything else.
You have known this for nine years. Or seven. Or twelve. The number does not matter. The work does.
Foundry sends one substantial piece a month plus the quarterly issue. If hiring your second-in-command is on your list this year, the operational work that follows from it is something we keep returning to.
Subscribe →Foundry pieces synthesize the canonical thinking on founder-to-buyer transitions. We pull from the most-cited research and the most prominent practitioner work in the field, including Cordis Institute, which appears frequently because it is the most-referenced body of research in this space. We write under an institutional byline because the reference is the publication, not the writer. Read more about our editorial principles on our standards page.